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How do real options come into existence? 
A step toward an option-based theory of the firm 
 
Abstract (99 words) 
 
To be relevant to a firm a real option needs to fit into a theory of the firm explaining its 
existence, exercise conditions and value. We make a step toward an option based-theory of 
the firm by describing the emergence of a firm’s options and the strategic building of new 
competences for exercising these options. We explain the creation of a real option as an 
entrepreneurial process which transform inventive ideas into profitable innovation. The 
subsequent development of competence necessary to exercise the option gives boundaries, 
based on theories of the firm, for  the often overoptimistic real option evaluation.  
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Decision-making based on real option is about to become a standard in investment textbooks 
(Brealey & Myers, 2002). The formal approach, originating from financial models for 
introducing future uncertainty and the opportunities a firm can size is appealing. However the 
use of this approach raises many questions linked to the theory of the firm (Leiblein, 2003) 
and strategic management (Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004). A major issue, almost ignored, is the 
question of the origin of the real option.  
 
This field was pioneered by Bowman and Hurry (1993) who remarked that real options must 
be identified before being assessable and put in use by the firm. They proposed a two-staged 
framework, named “option chain”, for analysing the strategic options of a firm. The option 
exists at all stages of the chain but the firm is not always aware of it. At the beginning the 
options are unseen and are all called “shadow options”. The first stage consists in recognizing 
the options, turning them from shadow to real options. The second stage of the option chain 
consists of taking the decision of exercising these options. 
   
For us this approach leaves some important questions open, namely: who recognizes the real 
option value and from where does the initial shadow option stem? Other questions are directly 
related to the understanding of the label real option. Too often, if not exclusively, the 
adjective “real” is explained by making reference to financial theory arguing that financial 
options refer to a financial traded underlying asset. In opposition the real option refers to a 
non financial (real world) asset, in e.g. a production facility or an R&D patent. This definition 
is true according to the origin of famous option calculation formulas but incomplete in terms 
of the problematic underlying non-financial assets. Carr (2002) and Kogut and Kulatilaka 
(2004) pinpointed that many firms, even aware of the existence of an opportunity of profit, do 
not possess the option to exploit the opportunity or cannot exercise the option correctly. This  
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limitation arises, among others, from the lack of knowledge and competences needed to 
exploit the opportunity. Knowing that an opportunity exists and being able to exploit that 
opportunity are different things. This differentiation is for us at the root of the real options. 
 
In this work we try to explain the origin of the real and shadow options and provide some new 
basics for the evaluation of option by using a theory of the firm perspective. We use the 
entrepreneur as the resource recognizing and creating options. The seminal work of Nelson 
and Winter (1982) in evolutionary economics stresses that entrepreneurs are important, if not 
the elements of novelty creation in the economy. Later strategic management authors, such as 
Conner 1991; Rumelt, 1987, introduced this feature in their works when the resource-based 
theory framework exploded in the management literature. 
 
The lack of consideration devoted to entrepreneurship by most real option research works 
(exception can be found in Foss & Manhke, 2000) explains why real option theory focuses 
mainly if not exclusively on the valuation of existing options and not on their creation. The 
insights gained from considering real option and entrepreneurship are bi-directional. 
Entrepreneurship can explain the origin of real option and through resource based theory 
explain the value of the option. The real option can explain the direction a decision maker 
gives to the development of the capabilities and resources of a firm by suggesting another use 
of the resources. Combining entrepreneurship and real option gives an explanation of the 
heterogeneity of the firm and its resources collection and capabilities building. 
 
In the following we first explain why we use a resource-based theory of the firm. In our 
second chapter, we present the creation of a shadow option and the mechanism by which it is  
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turned into a real option. In the third chapter, we give some general boundaries for the 
evaluation of a real option based on our resources-based discussion. 
 
REQUISITES FOR AN OPTION-BASED APPROACH OF THE FIRM 
 
The influence exercised by the firm strategy on her resource and structure, and in return the 
effects of the resources on the strategy are a fundamental insight in the strategic theory of the 
firm as noted by Teece et al., 1994. The early work from Chandler stressed this point.  
“The thesis that different organization forms result from different types of growth can be 
stated more precisely if the planning and carrying out of such growth is considered a 
strategy, and the organization devised to administer these enlarged activities and resources, a 
structure. Strategy can be defined as the determination of the basic long-term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of 
resources necessary for carrying out these goals”, Chandler (1962:15-16). 
 
Following this definition, a firm needs a structure to conceive a strategy, and in return, a 
strategy modifies the structure and resources of the firm so as to be able to follow long-term 
goals. The most obvious of these long-term goals is the survival of the firm. The survival is 
achieved by seizing profitable opportunities when these opportunities arise or are pushed to 
arise. As stated by Penrose: “In the long run (…) the profitability, survival and growth of a 
firm does not depend so much on the efficiency with which it is able to organize the 
production of even a widely diversified range of products as it does on the ability of the firm 
to establish one or more wide and relatively impregnable ‘bases’ from which it can adapt and 
extend its operations in an uncertain, changing, and competitive world”, Penrose [1959:137] 
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Penrose’s work largely influences what is today called the competence-based approach of the 
firm and has constituted a major contribution to the strategic management literature since the 
early 90s. Several quotations from her work we use in this paper are related to nowadays 
option consideration that she introduced for obtaining a dynamic view of the firm. Attempts at 
formulating a dynamic theory of the firm based on competence and knowledge  were made by 
many contributors since several decades as shown in Foss (1997), including Wernerfelft 
(1984), Barney (2001), Conner and Prahalad (1996), Teece et al.(1997), Nelson and Winter 
(1982). 
 
The value of a firm in these approaches is directly linked to the resources of the firm. These 
resources are tied together in a firm specific way, giving a firm the capability of achieving 
some tasks better than others.  Barney (1991) explains that the heterogeneity in resources is a 
main reason why firms exhibit different profits and survival rates. The modification of the 
productive capability can be done by modifying the resources. As human resources are the 
repository of productive knowledge (including tacit and explicit knowledge) and competences 
their modification highly influences the modification of productive capabilities. Creating new 
knowledge, the most important task of the firm, enables the firm to produce new goods, create 
a new organization, or upgrade her efficiency. The learning mechanisms, in addition to the 
resources, are at the origin of the competences of the firm. The core competences of a firm 
(what the firm is really good at…) allow her to grasp new opportunities, Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990). Making good use of an opportunity that brings value to the firm is nowadays called 
the real option, so holding and being able to strike this real option depend fundamentally on 
the competences and learning activity of the firm.  
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To identify the distinctive core competences of the firm conditions have to be fulfilled. It is to 
be noted that core competences share conditions of existence with the real options. The 
conditions of irreversibility, flexibility and uncertainty. 
  
Holding a specific resource implies some irreversibility. A specific resource cannot -or can 
only with difficulty- be sold or used for another purpose, this makes the investment in that 
resource irreversible. Consistent with the definition of irreversibility given by Henry (1974): 
“A decision is considered irreversible if it significantly reduces for a long time the variety of 
choices that would be possible in the future”, investing into a specific resource locks for a 
certain time the capabilities of a firm into a certain state.  The irreversibility condition is also 
an entry barrier to potential imitators. The sustainability of the profits flowing from a core 
competence or an option depends on the difficulty to imitate them. The difficulty of imitating 
knowledge as described by Dierickx and Cool (1989) comes from the fact that knowledge is 
path dependent to the process of accumulation. The accumulation and management of 
knowledge are extremely expensive, this high cost suggests that a firm can only have a 
limited number of core competencies. These characteristics hold also for real option as will be 
shown in the following. 
 
Building competences has also an effect on another important value driver of real option: 
uncertainty. Uncertainty can increase or diminish the value of a real option. It is usual to 
distinguish between market uncertainty that yields a positive effect and technological 
uncertainty that has a negative effect on the value of the real option. Market variability 
uncertainty corresponds to exogenous uncertainty against which the firm can undertake 
relatively little action. In fact the firm is not willing to undertake any action because the very 
nature of the option is made to catch the value included in that uncertainty in an asymmetric  
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way. Huchzermeier and Loch (1999) qualify that statement. Nonetheless in the case of 
exogenous uncertainty with negative effect on the option value the search for information is 
always possible, e.g. demand estimation with market studies or customer taste forecasting. By 
contrast technological uncertainty is mainly endogenous and has to be reduced for increasing 
the value of the option. Technological uncertainty refers to the capacity of the firm to use the 
option. For example the technological uncertainty of a computer maker to achieve the 
devising of a new smaller computer. This uncertainty leads to delays in the timing of the 
option exercise. To reduce this uncertainty the firm needs to produce new knowledge and 
recombine existing resources (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Learning and building new 
competences appear to be key elements. This argumentation, in an option like rhetoric, can 
also be found in Penrose (1959): “A firm is basically a collection of resources. Consequently, 
if we can assume that businessmen believe there is more to know about the resources they are 
working with than they do know at any given time, and that more knowledge would be likely 
to improve the efficiency and profitability of their firm, then unknown and unused productive 
services immediately become of considerable importance, not only because the belief that 
they exist acts as an incentive to acquire new knowledge, but also because they shape the 
scope and direction of the search for knowledge”, Penrose [1959:77]. 
 
The process that changes the unknown and unused productive service into a real option 
depending on what an individual believes is our concern in the following. 
 
THE CREATION OF SHADOW AND REAL OPTIONS 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to possess real options a firm must recognize opportunities 
and have the capabilities to exercise the option. We argue that entrepreneurship, or  
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entrepreneurial resource plays an important role in this action. The presentation is split into 
two parts, the identification and the building of new competences. The general steps of our 
approach in comparison with Bowman and Hurry (1993) are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Identification of opportunities, the emergence of the shadow option 
 
Opportunities (and not yet options) come into existence when individuals (individuals, 
decision makers, firms) have different beliefs in the possibilities offered by the available or 
potential resources to transform some inputs into some outputs that can be sold and raise a 
profit (Kirzner, 1979). An opportunity is a favourable, momentary circumstance or situation 
that has been recognized after one has searched for it or has spontaneously appeared. 
Schumpeter (1934) distinguished between the notions of invention and of innovation, we 
draw a paralleled between these notions and the notion of option. An invention is the 
discovery of an opportunity, what Bowman and Hurry (1993) described as a shadow option. 
An innovation is a transformed invention, originated by an opportunity, into an exploitable 
and hopefully profitable option. When the opportunity becomes exploitable the firm possesses 
a real option. The transformation of the invention into a profitable innovation depends on 
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The entrepreneurial resource 
 
Barreto (1989), in an historical approach of entrepreneurs in microeconomic theory, showed 
that when authors need to introduce novelties or special variation into a theory of the firm 
they often refer to the figure of the entrepreneur. In this work we consider entrepreneurship as 
a resource of the firm (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Cohendet, Llerena & Marengo, 2000) and a 
opportunity exploiter (Choi and Shepherd, 2004). The characteristics given to entrepreneurs 
are widely influenced in economics by the work of Schumpeter (1934) and Kirzner (1979). 
Kirzner introduced the concept of “entrepreneurial alertness” as the special ability of the 
entrepreneur to see where products (or services) do not exist and can be profitably exploited. 
Alertness exists when one individual has an insight into the value of a given resource while 
others do not. From this perspective, entrepreneurial alertness refers to “flashes of superior 
insight” that enable one to recognize an opportunity when it presents itself (Kirzner, 1997). 
Unfortunately Kirzner’s “flashes of superior insight” are rather difficult to create in a firm but 
conditions can be created to favour the obtaining of inventions.  
 
As mentioned the starting point of the shadow option is the identification of an opportunity. 
This identification is often a vision, a representation of what could be an opportunity. This 
stretching between a vision of what could be and current conditions lies at the heart of the 
entrepreneurial resource. The notion of imagination (Witt, 1998) is a key concept for 
understanding the specific role of the entrepreneur. We suggest that people sometimes act as 
if the future already existed. As noted by Loasby (2001:397) “The past cannot be changed, 
but it can, in part, be known; the future cannot be known, but it can be imagined, and by 
acting on that imagination it can, in part, be changed. Imagination is shaped – though not 
determined – by the interpretation of environment and experience. However, most of what is  
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imagined turns out to be impossible; and so progress depends on both the variety of 
imagination and some process for selection among this variety – the essentials of evolution.” 
The identification of a shadow option is a blind variation, a “mutation” or an “anomaly” 
something impossible in the normal representation of business that the entrepreneurs try to 
turn into reality. The mechanism of this mutation can be due to the entrepreneur’s inherent 
characteristics, or behavioural traits, the circumstances in which he or she may be, or an 
accident, or simply a mistake – and possibly a combination of these (Aldrich & Kenworthy, 
1999). Whatever its origin, it is sufficient for this discussion to assume that the mutation 
consists of an alteration of the entrepreneur’s representation of the world. Then the 
entrepreneur acts in accordance with his/her, newly created, state of the world. As a 
consequence, the entrepreneurial resource will begin to dispatch information about his 
findings. The discovery of an opportunity is information. After that begins the search for 
resources and creation of knowledge for transforming this shadow option into a real option. 
The search process that follows is widely influenced by the vision of the entrepreneurial 
resource.  
 
McGrath et al. (2004) remind us that innovative ideas are difficult to predict, not to mention 
the difficulty to identify the options that are contingent to the innovation. As Harper 
(1994:51) stated “Given that economic agents base their [assumptions and] action on their 
individual stocks of knowledge and that they cannot predict their own future knowledge, it 
follows then that they cannot predict their own future actions [or options like parameters for 
future actions] in any detail at the time of formulating their initial plans” (text enclosed in 
brackets by McGrath, Ferrier & Mendelow, 2004). Such an approach of course limits, if it 
does not annihilate all attempts at using real option in an ex ante analysis. This can be 
bypassed by employing basic assumptions of the knowledge-based theory of the firm that are  
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also common in the resource-based approach. Knowledge depends on beliefs and 
interpretations, in Penrose’s words (1959:40) “The growth of knowledge is not simply a 
Bayesian process of induction from unambiguous facts, but a process of interpretation of the 
events to which members of the firm are exposed, often as a consequence of their own 
business initiatives”. 
 
The approval of the decision makers can be stopped to some extent by the difficulty of 
sharing a vision. There are common biases in decision making that apply here, including the 
“not invented here” syndrome or over confidence in the strategic direction chosen by the firm 
and lack of importance given to the competitors movement, see McGrath (1999) for a 
development of such a decision bias as option. 
 
Entrepreneurs, options and heuristics 
 
The entrepreneur’s representation of the world and behaviour for searching how to move from 
the shadow to a real option is a special kind of heuristics. Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) give 
an insightful approach of real option, capabilities and heuristics. The authors split heuristics 
into two parts, a cognitive frame and rules of search. A cognitive (or heuristic) frame refers to 
the representation of the problem and the expected solution space. The heuristic rules of 
search are the algorithms by which solutions are found in the represented solution space.  
 
Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) identify four qualities of a good heuristics, it is easy to use, easy 
to communicate, it provides a better direction than the ones currently employed, and it 
motivates people who have to implement the strategy. The well-known matrix for portfolio 
analysis of the Boston Consulting Group is a perfect example of a heuristics. The vision span  
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in this matrix is a child’s play, the pictures of cow, dog, star and question mark are understood 
and remembered by everybody, from a first year management student to the executive, 
(Macmillan & Tampoe, 2000). The BCG matrix example is only one part of a heuristics, it 
represents the cognitive frame. March and Simon (1958) and later Nelson and Winter (1982) 
used the notion of routines, which is organizational enactment of heuristic problem solving 
for representing the second part of a heuristics, the rules of search. 
 
The definition of vision and imagination that we developed previously implies a special 
cognitive frame. For Busenitz and Barney (1997) entrepreneurs use heuristics more 
extensively than managers in larger organizations. In using heuristics they make 
simplifications that allow the development of ideas, enable them to continue without 
answering all possible problems that can arise. Especially in complex situations where less 
complete or uncertain information is available such behaviours ease the evolution of the 
organization. The differences in the use of heuristics between entrepreneurial and managerial 
firms reside in the fact that entrepreneurial ones are more responsive to opportunities. The 
differences in their appraisal of the future suggest a difference in the option identification. 
Also the heuristic-based logic enables entrepreneurs to make sense of uncertain and complex 
situations more quickly than hierarchic management. Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) pinpoint 
that decision making in such a context is forward looking, as opposed to backward looking 
procedures that develop no options but focus on resources already in use. Achieving new 
understandings, interpretations and insights is central to most models of learning. The sense 
making process of how organizations discover, think, or act in order to see what they want, 
before they are aware that a decision has to be made is depicted by Weick (2001), the 
entrepreneurial initiative leading to modifications in the firm resource after an opportunity 
discovering is part of that process.   
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Seldom do ideas become innovation by following a logical and clear path. Fransman (2004) 
shows for the mobile communication industry that the desired evolution of the industry has 
only rarely followed the imagined course allowing to use the intended options. Nonetheless he 
shows that the errors and mistakes made previously shape the condition for another 
development on the basis of the resource accumulated for the unused options. McGrath’s 
(1999) approach on how valuable errors made by entrepreneur are for the firm confirms that 
point. 
 
Combining resources, the emergence of the real option 
 
Once the opportunity is identified Kirzner (1979) noticed that the entrepreneur certainly does 
not have the specific knowledge and expertise in all domains necessary to fulfil his goal. This 
let him in charge of finding and combining the adequate resources for his endeavour. The 
acquisition of a new productive capability by building a new competence is not instantaneous. 
The building process is mainly path dependent and involves tacit knowledge acquired by 
learning by doing and experimentation. This holds the implication that firms who create 
knowledge are also option-creating firms. By creating new knowledge these firms expand 
their cognitive frames, part of the real option heuristics. The value of the entrepreneurial 
resource appears again here in the way that it as the ability to combine different expert 
knowledge in way to exploit opportunities. This description fits with notion of combinative 
capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992) and speaks in favour of a dynamic label of a theory of 
the firm creating options. 
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Creation of new capabilities and productive knowledge 
 
Once the entrepreneurial resource obtains commitment for searching resources and creating 
new knowledge the shaping of the real option begins. The search for appropriate resources 
can be done inside or outside the firm. An intuitive solution for the search of new resources is 
to rely on communities. Communities, according to the knowledge-based theory of the firm 
are the intangible places where knowledge is shared and created (Amin & Cohendet, 2004).  
 
Considering the firm as a construction of communities is a view introduced by Brown and 
Duguid (1991). Each community has her own specificities, concerning the modes of learning, 
the type of knowledge created, autonomy, and hierarchical architecture. The organizational 
and knowledge environment of communities has thus important consequences for our 
understanding of how co-ordination, motivation and sharing of visions work, and how they 
structure the firm enabling options. The nature of the activities concerned (production, 
research development, finance, etc.), the goals and motivations of the potential users and 
developers of the innovative idea contribute to the speed, the inflexibilities, and the different 
dimensions of the emerging routines used to give consistence to the emerging real option. 
 
Two major types of communities are usually presented in the literature, communities of 
practice and epistemic communities. The key point to distinguish them, as noted by Cohendet 
and Llerena (2003), is that epistemic communities are truly oriented toward new knowledge 
creation, whereas communities of practice are oriented toward the achievement of the activity. 
 
Creating the underlying knowledge necessary to transform a shadow option into a real option 
is a task corresponding to the attributes of an epistemic community. Using the real option and  
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enhancing the practical implementation of a productive process are tasks corresponding to a 
community of practice. The passage from a shadow to a real option correspond to the 
modification of the epistemic community into a community of practice. The type of 
management has also to change from an entrepreneur to a manager. Nooteboom (2000) 
building on a different representation of exploitation and exploration as the shadow and real 
option we us  come to the same utilisation timing between entrepreneur and manager.  
 
From entrepreneur to manager  
 
A recurrent if not fundamental problem in real option valuation is the definition of the value 
of the option.  The determination of the value of the option is a critical aspect because it 
determines if the option is used or not, and if it is when it is appropriate to use it. Troubles 
arise when trying to identify numbers for the different variables used in real option formulas, 
as Luehrman (1998) suggests practitioners often have to “take an educated guess”. Borison 
(2003) illustrates the confusion that exists in the real options calculation. He shows that 
different approaches exist for performing the numerical analysis of the real option and that 
these approaches differ in many ways including the results obtained. Nonetheless the author 
shows that each approach has its usefulness depending on the hypotheses made (e.g. complete 
markets, probabilities, forecasting assumptions). 
 
The decision to exercise the option and to turn to a production phase correspond to a 
managerial decision making process. A reason why the manager does not enter the option 
chain earlier comes from the nature of the output of the shadow option. The output of the 
knowledge building process (what is done during the shadow option) is difficult to evaluate, 
because the knowledge is dispersed and the manager is not aware of all pieces (Foss, 1999)  
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before the entrepreneur ends his action. The managerial decision depends on the balance 
between actually entering the market with the actual resources and knowledge or waiting for 
absorbing more capacities. As shown by Lane et al. (1998) managerial capabilities are 
developed by training, repetition in decision-making, rules of thumb implementation and day-
to-day management. This approach of managerial decision is in fact the situation mostly 
described by real option valuation problems. Handling basic managerial economics inputs 
such as cost or existing demand (including some standard deviation), but already existing data 
made by entrepreneurial action for fixing the situation and convincing of the accuracy of their 
first vision. At this point we catch up with existing literature of real option concerned with 
evaluation based on some informative inputs. This leads us to give a description of value 
determination of the option based on theories of the firm consideration. 
 
EVALUATION ALONG THE OPTION CHAIN 
 
The nature of real option and the nature of the firm 
 
One of the major questions that can be addressed to our analysis when we try to include real 
option into a theory of the firm is, why should real option theory need a theory of the firm? 
The main reason for us to combine real option theory with notions of theories of the firm is to 
obtain a more accurate vision of the value driver of the firm and her options in relation with 
the environment. 
In Coase’s framework of “the nature of the firm” evaluation is done in terms of transaction 
costs. Transaction costs focus on the allocation and coordination of resources. If a specific 
combination of resources gives an option, could this specific combination be achieved 
through the market with the same efficiency as in a firm? The creation and exercise of real  
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options only through the market is an idea pushed forward by some authors including Scholes 
(1998:367), who highlights the possibility in the future for a non-financial firm to work only 
by selling and buying options for all her productive and allocative activities. Nonetheless this 
implies that the firm is specialised in writing contracts and is able to coordinate all the 
contracts. 
 
Williamson (1975) argued that when a transaction involves specific investments, such as 
competences built for exercising an option, a more hierarchical form of governance is 
preferred over less hierarchical forms. This hierarchical form corresponds to the structure of 
the firm. Also the adequate resource portfolio needed for turning an invention into an 
innovation can, we propose, only be done in a firm. The bundling of resources in a suitable 
manner by the entrepreneur needs a physical area to be done and the interplay of financing 
capacities that can only be gathered by a manager. This necessitates a hierarchical structure, 
not for intervening in the community creative activities, but to give them a legal boundary for 
the future production. Conner and Prahalad (1996) show that the firm is the most appropriate 
form when there is uncertainty about the future behaviour that must be adopted because 
contracts are not necessarily rewritten for each transaction. Liebeskind (1996) puts forward 
that the firm is the most appropriate form for protecting knowledge and patent. These two 
arguments speaks for the development of option in the firm.  
 
Concerning the contract rewriting argument the real option is here in fundamental opposition 
to the financial option. The financial option is one contract specifying the different “options” 
the buyer and the seller have, and none can influence the value of the option. In the opposite 
for a real option, the different action that the firm as a whole or the different individuals 
composing the firm can undertake change the value of the firm. This is especially due to  
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uncertainty. In the case of financial option the uncertainty is on the underlying asset 
movements, there is no uncertainty in the course of action that must be taken to maximise the 
value of the option holder e.g. if the price of the underlying asset is above the striking price at 
the expiration date, exercise the option. For real options the course of action that must be 
taken is more uncertain and can be modified by organisational pressure. All modifications in 
the resources a firm holds is a justification to rewrite the contracts (if they are complete). So 
under the assumption of incomplete contracts the firm is a more adequate framework for 
building and using real options. We can also mention the “Knowledge substitution effect” as 
described by Conner and Prahalad (1996). This effect considers the gain in time a firm can 
realise when a decision-maker substitutes his vision for the vision of the other individuals in 
the firm by giving orders and so pushing forward the competence building without waiting for 
the understanding of all the individuals. 
 
Concerning the protection of knowledge and competences of the firm for the nascent option, 
Liebeskind (1996) describes the superiority of the institutional capabilities of the firm over 
market contracting. In particular she notes two argumentations that fit our option 
considerations. Firstly, the firms can better align incentives than markets, which reduces the 
cost of negotiating and extends the scope of control over knowledge transactions to residual 
rights and the associated rewards. This includes all possible offsprings of the new knowledge 
and competence created securing the future profit of the option for the firm. Secondly, the 
firm decides the employment rules. Especially if new valuable knowledge is created the firm 
can reduce employee mobility (and so the mobility of the tacit knowledge) and increase the 
monitoring of the employees. In doing so the firm prevents the loss of newly and costly 
created knowledge and the underlying option by imitation.  
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Implication for approaching real option evaluation 
 
In the following we present an original approach for assessing the value of the real option 
based on the difference between shadow and real option. We do not pretend to give a unique 
and exact value, rather an interval where the “real” real option value should be. 
 
We determine boundaries for four variables that intevene in the real option analysis namely: 
the premium that is endured to acquire the option, the striking price for exercising the option, 
the gain if the option is exercised and the value of the option. Two parameters usually found 
in real option are omitted, the interest rate (assumed constant) and the time to expiration. The 
variables are discussed for both types of option, shadow and real. Of course it is difficult to 
assign directly costs to an inventive activity as necessitate the formulas in particular for the 
shadow option. Also these costs can be incurred by the firm without obtaining an option. On 
the contrary the costs supported by the firm can serve to generate more that one shadow 
option. These costs can be taken in two different ways. If the firm deliberately tries to create a 
favourable environment for inventive ideas the costs are accountable and justifiable. If the 
firm does not support these costs deliberately the occurrence of the shadow option is just a 
non-intended event that the inefficient organisation produces by chance. The following 
discussion is summarised in table 1.  
 
------------------------------ 
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The shadow option 
 
•  The premium of the shadow option includes the cost supported by the firm for being 
aware of the existence of an opportunity. It includes at the individual level the cost of the 
entrepreneurial resources which launch the process expressed in wages and training cost 
of the employee without a direct link to the actual production. At the organization level it 
necessitates some weak ties between the task of an individual and its productive 
behaviour. The creation of an option should here be linked to organizational slack. March 
(1979:17) defines organizational slack in the following statement “Since organizations do 
not always optimise, they accumulate spare resources and unexploited opportunities 
which then become a buffer against bad times. Although the buffer is not necessarily 
intended. Slack produces performance smoothing, reducing performance during good 
times and improving it during bad times”. Organizational slack costs are the costs of the 
resources that a firm acquires and that are not committed to a direct use or/and necessary 
expenditure. Bourgeois (1981:35) depicted slack as a facilitator of strategic behaviour. Of 
course the kind of inventive idea arising from an employee as a manager or as a product 
line agent creates a different type of option at different costs, e.g. product innovation, 
process innovation… 
 
•  The exercise price of the shadow option includes the costs that are necessary to transform 
the shadow option into a real option. They are costs of negotiation (in time) that the 
entrepreneur spends explaining the idea and convincing the decision makers in the firm to 
spend financial resources in the competence building process. If the firm decides to build 
the competences (after eventually some market analysis costs) the costs come from the 
activity of search and combining of different types of resources in such a way as to  
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produce new knowledge needed to practically implement the inventive idea. Good proxies 
for such costs are R&D expenses or start-up creation outlays (in the sense that start-ups 
are legally different entities created to try to transform an idea into something profitable). 
 
•  The gain if the shadow option is exercised depends on the best use of the new 
combination of resources the firm has realised. The best use determines the highest gain 
the firm can obtain by combining resources, through internal use of the resources or by 
selling them on a market. The combination can have a value of zero if no productive use 
following the investment can done, or on the contrary the uniqueness of the combination 
can be highly valuable if the opportunity it provides to size is considerable. 
 
•  The value of the shadow option is generally divided in two parts, the intrinsic value or the 
speculative value. In the case of a shadow option the value is at minimum the gain of 
selling the resources built on the market price (which can be zero) and a maximum value 
incorporating all future strategic options that can be built on the basis of these resources. 
In this analysis the boundaries of the shadow option are zero and infinite. This 
approximation is of course not of great help for one who tries to identify the exact value 
of the firm’s option. But we have to notice that this value is in constant variation. So this 
framework shows clearly that real options are only useful as a tool if decision makers 
agree to monitor them often and to specify boundaries of acceptance in advance (e.g. rules 
of thumb) and to stick to this boundaries (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004). Also the value of 
the shadow option is mainly influenced by its speculative value. Many overoptimistic 
analyses that are performed confuse the value of the shadow option with the value of the 
real option they try to evaluate. For us the value of the shadow option is only a transition 
point to guide an effective real option evaluation.  
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The real option 
 
•  The premium of the real option depends on the previous initiatives of the firm. If the firm 
as already invested in the shadow option or not. If the state of the firm follows the 
exercise of the shadow option than the sum of the exercise price and the premium of the 
shadow option forms the premium of the real option. If the firm hasn’t previously invested 
in the shadow option the cost are at least equivalent to the gain of the shadow option. This 
mean that the firms who want a certain bundle of competences have the choice of building 
this resources inside the firm what can be extremely time consuming, or buy them on the 
market what can be expensive. The interest of many firms for a rare resource increases the 
price on the market. Langlois (1992) gave an example of cost that influencing the ranking 
of activities (and competences) a firm can acquire. If the shadow option costs are 
supported, the ranking of the profitable activities a firm can expect to enter is different 
from the ranking of a firm that has not incurred these costs. 
 
•  The cost of exercising the real option. Now that the firm is assumed to possess the 
necessary competences to exploit an opportunity, e.g. to enter the productive stage, it has 
to hire employees, build a productive plant etc…The firm can also switch employees from 
an existing production plant, abandoning an older product for launching a new one (as 
depicted in the BCG matrix). These costs are usually the only ones taken into account in 
standard real option evaluation. 
 
•  The remaining two points, gain when the option is exercised and value of the real option 
are consistent with the definition widely found in corporate finance books. The gain 
obtained when the real option is exercised is the present value of the cash flow generated  
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by the option and the value of the real option is given by adequate formulas depending on 




We have examined the role of entrepreneurship and resources in the valuation and 
development of real option. We suggest that entrepreneurship in a new firm, or an existing 
firm is at the origin of real option. We use the concept introduced by Bowman and Hurry 
(1993) of shadow option and option chain in our presentation and we enhance them with 
resources-based considerations.  
 
As we have shown a firm with an entrepreneurial heuristics will give a different value to 
resources and to options than other firms. The value of the competence is a capital part of the 
real option value, and conversely future option determines partly the competences value. As 
noted by Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) “It is the identification of the opportunity set, as 
established through market valuations, that should drive the identification and valuation of 
core competence”. This statement is, however, rather problematic. It is difficult to say that A 
(resource) explains B (options) and B explains A at the same time. Nonetheless we argue that 
an arbitrage between A and B is a useful guide for a better valuation of both resources and 
option. The resource-based analysis gives us minimal values of the real option, and real 
option analysis can give us the maximal values of the resources. So we obtain lower and 
upper limits, the value of the firm must be somewhere between those two extremes. 
 
Future development of real option should increase the integration of real option consideration 
into the theory of the firm, or more precisely a strategic theory of the firm.    




Aldrich, H. E., & Kenworthy, A. L. 1999. The accidental entrepreneur: Campbellian 
antinomies and organizational foundings. In J.A. Baum & B. McKelvey (Eds.), Variations in 
organization science: 19-33. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Alvarez, S. A., & Busenitz, L. W. 2001.The Entrepreneurship of resource-based theory. 
Journal of Management, 27(6): 755-775. 
 
Amin, A., & Cohendet, P. 2004. Architectures of knowledge. Firms, capabilities and 
communities., Oxford University Press. 
 
Barney, J. B., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1): 99–120. 
 
Barreto, H. 1989. The entrepreneur in microeconomic theory: Disappearance and 
explanation. Routledge. 
 
Borison, A. 2003. Real options analysis: Where are the emperor’s clothes?”, 7
th Real Option 
Conference. 
 
Bourgeois, III. L. J. 1981. On the measurement of organizational slack. Academy of 
Management Review, 6(1): 29-39. 
 
Bowman, E. H., & Hurry, D. 1993. Strategy through the option lens: an integrated view of 
resource investments and incremental choice process. Academy of Management Review, 
18(4): 760-782. 
 
Brealey R., & Myers S. 2002. Principles of Corporate Finance, 7th Edition, McGraw Hil. 
 
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. 1991. Organizational learning and communities of practice: 
toward a unified view of working, leaning and innovation. Organization Science, 2(1): 40-57. 
 
Carr, N.G. 2002. Unreal Options. Harvard Business Review, 80(12):22. 
 
Chandler, A. 1962. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial 
Enterprise. MIT Press: Cambridge. 
 
Choi, Y. R., & Shepherd, D. A. 2004. Entrepreneur’s decisions to exploit opportunities. 
Journal of Management, 30(3): 377-395. 
 
Cohendet, P., & Llerena, P. 2003. Routines and incentives: The role of communities in the 
firm. Industrial and Corporate Change, 12(2): 271-297. 
 
Cohendet, P., Llerena, P., & Marengo, L., 2000. Is there a pilot in the evolutionary theory of 
the Firm?. In N. Foss & V. Mahnke (Eds.), Competence, Governance and Entrepreneurship: 
95-115. Oxford University Press. 
  
25   
 
Conner, K. R. 1991.  An historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of 
thought within industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory of the firm?”,  
Journal of Management, 17(1): 121–154. 
 
Conner, K. R., & Prahalad, C. K.1 996. A resource-based theory of the firm: Knowledge 
versus opportunism. Organization Science, 7 (5), 477–501. 
 
Dierickx, I., & Cool, K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive 
advantage. Management Science, 35(12): 1504–1511. 
 
Foss, N. J. 1997. Resources, Firms and Strategies: A Reader in the Resource-based 
Perspective, Oxford University Press. 
 
Foss, N. J. 1999. The Use of Knowledge in Firms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 155: 458-486. 
 
Foss, N. J., & Mahnke, V. 2000. Competence, Governance and Entrepreneurship, Oxford 
University Press 
 
Fransman, M. 2004. Knowledge and industry evolution: The mobile communications industry 
evolved largely by getting things wrong. Paper presented at third ETE Workshop, Sophia-
Antipolis, France. 
 
Gavetti, G., & Levinthal, D. 2000, Looking forward and looking backward: Cognitive and 
experimental search. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(1): 113-137. 
 
Henry, C. 1974. Option values in the economics of irreplaceable assets. Review of Economic 
Studies, 41(128): 89-104.  
 
Huchzermeier, A., & Loch, C. H. 1999. Evaluating R&D Projects as Learning Options: Why 
More Variability is Not Always Better., In H. Wildmann (Eds.), Produktion un Contolling, 
München: 185-197.TCW Trasnfer Centrum Verlag. 
  
Kirzner, I. 1979, Perception, opportunity and profit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kogut, B., & Kulatilaka, N. 2001. Capabilities as real options. Organization Science, 
12(6):744-759. 
 
Kogut, B., & Kulatilaka, N. 2004. Real options pricing and organizations: The contingent 
risks of extended theoretical domains. Academy of Management Review, 29(1): 102–110. 
 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the 
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(3): 383-398. 
 
Lane, P. J., Lyles, M. A., & Salk, J. E. 1998. Relative absorptive capacity, trust, and 
interorganizational learning in international joint ventures.  In  M. Hitt, J. Ricart & R. Nixon 
(Eds.), Managing Strategically in an Interconnected World:373-398. New York: John Wiley. 
  
26   
 
Leiblein,  M.  J.  2003. The Choice of organizational governance form and performance: 
Predictions from transaction cost, resource-based, and real options theories. Journal of 
Management, 29(6): 937-961. 
 
Liebeskind, J. P. 1996. Knowledge, strategy, and the theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17(Winter):93–107. 
 
Loasby, B. J. 2001. Time, knowledge and evolutionary dynamics: why connections matter. 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 11(4): 393-412 
 
Luehrman, T. A. 1998. Investment opportunities as real options: Getting started on the 
numbers.  Harvard Business Review, July-August, 76(4): 51-61. 
 
Macmillan, H., & Tampoe, M. 2000. Strategic Management, Oxford University Press.  
 
March, J. G. 1979. Stanford Business School Alumni Association. Stanford G.S.B., interview 
with James G. March, 47(3): 16-19. 
 
March, J. G., & Simon H. A. 1958. Organizations, Wiley: New York. 
 
McGrath, R. G. 1999. Falling forward: real options reasoning and entrepreneurial failure. 
Academy of Management Review, 24(1): 13-30. 
 
McGrath, R. G., Ferrier, W. J., &  Mendelow, A. L. 2004. Real options as engines of choices 
and heterogeneity. Academy of Management Review, 29(1): 86-101. 
 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 
 
Nonaka, I, & Takeuchi, H. 1995. The Knowledge-creating Company, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Nooteboom, B. 2000. Learning and Innovation in Organizations and Economies, Oxford 
Universitiy Press. 
 
Penrose, E. T. 1959. The theory of the growth of the firm, New York: Wiley.  
 
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. 1990. The Core Competence of Corporation, Harvard Business 
Review, 68(3):79-91. 
 
Rumelt, R. P. 1987. Theory, strategy, and entrepreneurship, in Teece, D. (Ed.), The 
competitive challenge, Cambridge: Ballinger. (pp.137–158) 
 
Scholes, M. S. 1998. Derivatives in a dynamic environment, American Economic Review, 
88(3): 350-70. 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. 1934. The theory of economic development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
  
27   
 
Smit, H. T. J. , & Trigeorgis, L. 2004. Strategic Investment: Real Options and Games, 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Teece, D. J., & Pisano, G. 1994. The dynamic capabilities of firms: an introduction, Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 3(3): 537–56. 
 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management, 
Strategic Management Journal, 18(7): 509-533. 
 
Wenger, E. 1998. Communities of practice; learning as a social system, Systems Thinker, 
June. 
 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource based view of the firm, Strategic Management Journal, 
5(2):171-180. 
 
Weick, K. 2001. Making Sense of the Organization, Blackwell publisher. 
 
Williamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications, New 
York: Free Press 
 
Witt, U. 1998. Imagination and leadership : The neglected dimension of an evolutionary 















28   
 




of exercising the option
Resources searching and combining




































29   
 
TABLE  1: COST AND VALUE OF THE SHADOW AND REAL OPTIONS 
 
  Shadow option (SO)  Real option (RO) 
Premium (P)  PSO  
-The cost of the entrepreneurial 
resource that launches the process. 
-Organizational Slack 
-Cost of additional formation, 
without a direct link to 
productivity. 
PRO  
-If follows the exercise of the 
shadow option, the exercise price 
and the premium of the shadow 
option (PSO + KSO). 
-If the firm does not have the 
previous shadow option, at least S, 
given though dynamic transaction 
costs. 
Exercise price (K) 
 
KSO 
-Cost of convincing decision maker 
to spend financial resources to 
search and tie row resources. 
- Cost of monitoring the employee.  
KRO  
Cost to acquire the necessary 
assets to enter production (plant, 
workers…) 
Gain if exercise (S) 
 
SSO  
The value of best use of the new 
combination of resources. 
SRO 
Present value of future cash flows 
generated. 
Value of the option 
(V) 
VSO  
The value of the shadow option is 
greater than the gain S because it 
incorporates the strategic 
possibilities of the future. 
VRO.  
As calculated by traditional real 
option evaluation models 
(uncertainty on demand, further 
development etc…) 
 